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Abstract
Planning for the population's healthcare needs of the future is no easy task, but it is the first step in planning for a new medical facility. In this time of budget constraints, it will be a challenge for any organization to determine not only the most appropriate facility design, but also the capital equipment requirements.
The purpose of this study was to determine the accuracy of the Army's current equipment estimation process during initial outfitting through the analysis of historical projects. The analysis revealed that on seven past projects, the Army was within budget on six projects. However, limitations of the study reveal that the results are truly inconclusive due to a small sample size and missing data.
The study also identified variables that may be important in the cost forecasting process but are not currently included in the Army's budgeting methodology. For example, other organizations are including freight, storage, installment, and procurement assistance costs in budget estimates. Inclusion, or at least evaluation of these variables, may provide the possibility of further accuracy during the equipment budgeting process for the Army.
Equipment Cost Forecasting 4
The results lead to an unexpected conclusion that relates more toward a change in procedure than a change in the actual budget estimate figure. The private sector clearly has better data collection methods for tracking equipment planning during construction. The military health system (MHS) must centralize and standardize equipment data collection and reporting in order to conduct any historical or prospective analysis that can be useful in developing budget estimates. Tables   Table 1 Service Comparison of Equipment Budgeting  during Initial Outfitting   Table 2 Summary of Equipment Costs by Project   Table 3 Composite Inflation Rates As the healthcare industry as a whole has shifted from inpatient to ambulatory care, the need for large inpatient hospitals has declined leaving many organizations with facilities that are not designed for today's wellness-based approach. In fact, in many hospitals across the country, it is common to see old patient rooms converted into office spaces, reflecting the national decline in inpatient census.
This major change in the delivery of care requires an organization to be strategic in its thinking. Though this is certainly the starting point, it is not enough. "Important as those strategies may be, they'll be tough to implement in buildings designed in the 1950s and '60s" (Borling, 1997, p. 42) . Planning the scope of services a hospital chooses to offer will ultimately dictate the type of facility needed and the medical technology or equipment that will go in it. Many organizations have had to renovate existing facilities and/or build new ones, to keep up with the future needs of the patients.
Planning for the population's healthcare needs of the future is no easy task, but it is the first step in planning a new facility. In this time of budget constraints for both public and private sector healthcare, it will be a challenge for any organization to determine not only the most appropriate facility design but also the capital equipment requirements.
Most health care administrators agree that to be successful in the industry, they have to "balance the emerging medical technology required to deliver optimum patient care with ever escalating costs associated with the implementation of this new technology" (Barry and Dalton, 1998, p. 1) .
Conditions which prompted the Study
Though all of this change may be frightening to many healthcare executives, it should not be a signal to stop investing in the organization's facilities. Rather, it should force health care administrators to see that "every dollar spent (during initial outfitting of healthcare facilities) must be carefully planned…" (Borling, 1997, p. 42 a. As defined by Army Medical Command. MEDCEN = Medical Center, MEDDAC = Medical Department Activity which is typically an Acute Care/Community Hospital, CLINIC = Acute Care Clinic, MED/DENT CLN = Medical/Dental Clinic. b. Replacement is building a new structural facility to replace the old; Renewal is renovating an existing structure; addition/alteration is adding a new structure to an existing structure and possibly renovating some of existing structure too; LSU is significant repairs to structure to comply with regulatory requirements such as EPA, OSHA, etc. c. The percentage of the facility cost or project amount (PA) attributed to equipment. d. The percentage of (c) that is to be funded by the Operations and Maintenance (OM) budget, which represents items less than $100,000 each. e. The percentage of (c) that is to be funded by the Other Procurement (OP) budget, which represents items greater than $100,000 each. However, the health care industry now requires a proactive instead of a reactive approach for building or redesigning facilities to meet the future needs of the community (1997).
"But market dynamics haven't necessarily killed innovative design and construction. In some locations the themes of preventive care, managed care, and the shift to outpatient care have found an architectural voice" (Appleby, 1995, p. 34) . In reality, organizations must make the transition if they hope to hold on to a piece of the market share.
One of the primary factors that has influenced the industry's need to be better equipment planners is the escalating cost of purchasing and maintaining medical technology. Hospitals that historically purchased only stateof-the-art medical equipment are now rethinking those decisions based on hard evidence derived from cost-benefit and profitability studies (Serb, 1997) . Capital resources are scarce and investing in the right equipment is crucial if an institution is to remain viable. Compared to the old days when big-ticket spending was the norm, the penny-pinching that goes on in the capital allocation budgets seems almost absurd.
However, changes in healthcare reimbursement, like capitation and resource based relative value system (RBRVS), make cost analyses essential when investing in capital equipment (Cerne, 1995) .
Consequently, it is more important than ever that the task of equipment planning during initial outfitting be appropriate, 
Results
The primary objective of this study was to determine the accuracy of the Army's equipment cost forecasting process for initial outfitting. Currently, the Army uses a percentage of the PA (i.e., total construction cost) to budget for equipment.
Again, these percentages are provided in Table 1 , along with the percentage estimates used by the other services. The DoD contractor analyzed data from seven Army medical construction projects, ranging from 1991 to 1998, to ascertain whether the budget percentages used by the Army were accurate. Table 2 reports the results. Table 2 reflects this weighted average.
Another (Campbell, personal communication, September, 14, 1998) . This is more in line with what some industry experts believe is the best methodology. Ritter and Barry both support the use of equipment lists in the initial planning stage and believe it is a far more accurate method than any use of percentage estimates.
Tenet does have standard percentage estimates for additional variables in the equipment budgeting process. Table 4 identifies these important variables in the equipment section as tax, freight, storage and installation. Again, the percentages were derived from evaluating historical projects and are updated as changes are revealed.
Both Columbia/HCA and Tenet manage projects centrally, and believe the methods they use have been accurate (typically within five percent for both organizations) and cite long project lead times and lack of centralized databases as the biggest obstacles for proper equipment planning in the military sector.
The Navy and Air Force equipment forecasting procedures for initial outfitting are similar to the Army in that both use a percentage of the PA to estimate costs. However, the similarities end there. Again, Table 1 shows the actual percentage estimates used by each service. In addition to the initial percentage estimates used by the Navy, Table 5 identifies the other variables used in its budgeting process.
This worksheet is similar to Tenet's in that both take percentages of the estimated total for equipment to calculate additional estimates for each project variable. For example, all projects add 7% of the actual equipment costs to account for procurement assistance. These are often surcharges associated Note-1 Enter the number "1" for appropriate type of facility. Note-2 2% of the Subtotal A amount due to voltage difference and procurement made from non-GSA/VA schedules. Note-3 3% of theSubtotal A amount due to expected shifts of Category "A" to Category "C" equipment. Note-4 7% of the Subtotal B amount for procurement assistance. Note-5 .5% of the Project Cost.
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with using various contracting activities. The Navy and Air
Force use various contracting activities that demand a surcharge and view this as a worthwhile cost to have quicker procurement.
The Army, however, does not utilize such agencies, which may explain the longer delays in procurement time.
The Air Force equipment forecasting process seems rather simplistic when compared to the other services and the civilian counterparts. As Table 1 was only available in a useable format for these seven projects.
The Army, like the other services, does not have detailed project data available in any organized manner for retrieval, unless, like in these particular projects, a civilian contractor was used for the equipment planning portion of the project.
Additionally, the Fort Sill project certainly requires further explanation because its estimated and actual spending figures appear to be the least aligned with the percent budgeted. With actual spending at 8.6% of the PA when the budgeting figure was 25%, even the contractor questioned the validity of the data. With large gaps in data such as this, no predictions, especially for the MEDDAC facility type, can possibly be made.
One point of discussion as a result of this analysis was what historical figure, estimated or actual equipment spending, should be used as the budgeting or planning figure for future projects? For determining budget accuracy, it is easy to look at actual spending patterns by project, which can be found in Table 2 . However, if planning the budget for a new MEDCEN, should the actual historical figure be used or the estimated figure? For example, in would be wiser to plan with the higher, or estimated equipment figure, since the amount of equipment that will actually be reutilized is unknown. Furthermore, the estimated equipment figure may allow for more leeway or cushion in the event additional spending is required.
Recommendations and Conclusion
Though the limitations of this study seem to raise more questions than answers, it is important to recognize that Currently, the historical data is simply not available that would help make positive changes to the way projects are budgeted. Though the results do not point to severe overspending in initial outfitting, the manipulations and gaps in the data make one question the reliability and validity of the existing data.
Not surprisingly, the comparative analysis portion of the study reveals that this problem is pervasive in the MHS. All the services have similar problems in collecting comparable project data for analysis. Therefore, the first step for all the services must be to determine and standardize how project data is going to be collected. Until this is done, collecting the data is pointless because there is no commonality for comparison and analysis. The MHS has already made significant strides in accomplishing more with less in a tri-service atmosphere (e.g., GME training, tri-service formularies, etc).
For the same reasons that these initiatives were started (i.e., cost savings and standardization), the MHS should pursue the possibility of a centralized DoD contract for equipment planning. This has the great potential to alleviate many of the problems identified in this study.
Furthermore, it may be more accurate to determine the typical number of projects by facility and project type over a period of time and use that number as a sample size. As previously mentioned, the results indicated the Army was within their budgeted range on most projects, but the sample size of seven is not enough to make any real determinations about historical spending patterns or predictions about future budgets.
Though the results may be different than expected, the analysis should still be the impetus for action in the area of cost forecasting. Again, this will only come after proper procedures have been developed to collect reliable information.
The study objective to evaluate the other services' and private sectors' cost forecasting techniques revealed some interesting information that should be investigated. Tenet
Healthcare and the Navy both include additional variables not currently used by the Army. Though the data is not available to prove that use of these variables increases the accuracy of the estimation process, it is certainly worth researching. It is always better to have equipment estimates higher than actual spending. The opposite situation leads to equipment shortfalls, minimization of services and unhappy beneficiaries.
Overall, the services should be concerned, though probably not surprised, by the results of this study. The MHS cannot continue to involve itself in processes that have no reliable monitoring methods. Continuing on this path only serves to reinforce the MHS' image of having inappropriate spending patterns -an image often portrayed by the media. However, the MHS should be enlightened by the fact that the problems identified in this study are ones with relatively easy solutions. A clearly established policy and mechanism for capturing the data during initial outfitting can mean great strides in the budget process for future medical construction projects.
